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Introduction
The representation of a strategic situation by means of a normal form game is one of the most fundamental constructions of game theory. But, while much w ork has been done devising and studying a variety of equilibrium concepts for both normal and extensive form games, not much h a s b e e n done to systematically di erentiate the in nite number of games and strategic situations that naturally arise in theory and practice. In other words, questions like, What types of games are there? or, What are meaningful distinctions between di erent strategic situations? are hardly addressed in a systematic way in the game theory literature. (In Section 5, we discuss some exceptions and other related literature.)
The present paper attempts to address such questions by i n troducing a general geometric procedure of de ning equivalence classes of normal form games from standard (non-cooperative) equilibrium concepts such as rationalizability, Nash, or correlated equilibrium. The idea is that the geometry of a given equilibrium correspondence re ects basic aspects of the logic or rationality underlying the equilibrium notion and can therefore be used to di erentiate or identify games. The procedure associates to each equilibrium correspondence its equivalence classes of games. This is done by using, on one hand, the relabeling of strategies and/or of players to identify games, and on the other, and here is where the geometry comes in, the path components at which a given correspondence is continuous. Thus two g a m e s that belong to the same path component, possibly after relabeling strategies and/or playe r s , a r e s a i d t o b e e q u i v alent relative t o t h e g i v en equilibrium correspondence.
Besides giving a sense of which aspects of normal form games di erent equilibrium concepts distinguish and which aspects they ignore, the obtained classi cations each p r o vide a compact organization of the underlying space of games into well-de ned and typically nite equivalence classes of games. Not only does this help to better understand the underlying equilibrium concepts and the geometries of their equilibrium correspondences, it also provides a natural and transparent w ay of comparing equilibrium concepts with each other. At the same time, it forces one to think about what the fundamental characteristics describing a strategic situation may be and why.
An essential requirement of the procedure is that it should not distinguish \too many" games. In this sense, one reason for focusing on the geometry (or continuity) of equilibrium correspondences is that it allows to identify games that from many other points of view would be regarded as di erent. Consider for example the game = (1 0) (0 1) (0 1) (1 ) ! : For = 0 this is a constant-sum game, while for any other value of it does not qualify as such. Yet, it seems clear that for values of close to zero relative to 1, the game retains the \character" of a constant-sum or at least of a matching pennies type game. Part of our task is to formally de ne notions of equivalence or of \types" of games in this sense. More speci cally, the procedure de ning the equivalence classes (see Definition 1) is based on two ingredients: (i) discontinuities of the underlying (equilibrium) correspondence | these are the geometric features, and (ii) relabeling of the strategies and/or of the players. Take a correspondence e : IR m ! X, where IR m is a space of games, e.g., a space of payo parameters, and where X is a set, e.g., the space of mixed strategies | e could for example be the Nash equilibrium correspondence. The discontinuities of e, or more precisely, the games at which e is discontinuous, divide the space of games IR m into a certain numb e r o f p a t h c o m p o n e n ts. All games in the same path component are then said to be equivalent relative to the correspondence e. F or example, it is easy to see that the Nash equilibrium correspondence is continuous on a neighborhood of the above g a m e with = 0, implying that all games in such a n e i g h borhood are what we call Nash equivalent. This is the rst ingredient.
Moreover, following traditional game theory, t wo games that di er only by relabeling of the strategies and/or of the players are also necessarily equivalent | this is the second ingredient. Two games in two disconnected components will be equivalent if one can be obtained from the other through such relabeling of strategies and/or of players. For example, the game 0 = (0 1) (1 0) (1 0) ( 1) ! :
is always equivalent to the game above, since it is obtained from it by relabeling the two p l a yers. Therefore, from the above, we can infer that all games in a neighborhood of with = 0 are also Nash equivalent t o 0 with = 0, but also to games in a neighborhood of the latter. Given that for semi-algebraic correspondences, which include the rationalizable, Nash, and correlated equilibrium correspondences among others, the number of resulting path components is always nite, (see, e.g., Schanuel et al. (1991) and Blume and Zame (1994) , and Lemmas 1 and 6 below), and since the number of path components is an upper bound for the number of equivalence classes distinguished, this implies that the classi cations obtained for semi-algebraic correspondences distinguish nitely many equivalence classes of games. While this already reduces the in nitely many normal form games to nite numbers of equivalence classes, depending on the correspondences, these numbers could in principle still be very large even for say t h e 2 2 games.
After formally de ning the procedure, we consider the space of 2 2 two player games and show that reasonable distinctions are obtained in this case. In particular, we show that, applying the procedure to the rationalizability, Nash, and correlated equilibrium concepts, leads to the same three classes of generic 2 2 games being distinguished, namely, (a-i) games of the matching pennies type (or with zero pure Nash equilibria), (a-ii) games solvable by iterated strict dominance (or with unique pure Nash equilibrium), and (a-iii) coordination type games (or with two pure Nash equilibria) see Proposition 2.
On the other hand, when applied to the concept of robust equilibrium of Kajii and Morris (1997a, b) , still within generic 2 2 games, the procedure yields a di erent classi cation, 1 namely, (b-i) games of the matching pennies type on one hand, and (b-ii) games solvable by iterated strict dominance and coordination games on the other see Proposition 3. We view the fact the two classi cations are not the same as signi cant. Essentially, it is related to the fact that games of the form = (1 1) (0 0) (0 0) ( ) ! are all equivalent relative to the robust equilibrium concept, regardless of whether is positive or negative, as long as it is not equal to 1. 2 This is not true for the other three concepts, since the set of rationalizable strategies as well as the sets of correlated and Nash equilibria all change abruptly as goes from being negative to being positive. On the other hand, the correspondences of these three concepts, ar all continuous at = 1, unlike the robust equilibria. We brie y argue in the paper that experimental evidence appears to be more supportive of the classi cation obtained with robust equilibria, at least in the 2 2 case (see Section 4) . However, we believe t h a t e xperiments, testing equilibrium concepts relative to the equivalence classes implied, have only partially been performed, and think that, in principle, they could provide useful tests of equilibrium theories. In fact, the location of a game within an equivalence class may contain relevant information, and a measure of distance of a given game to the nearest discontinuity o f the underlying equilibrium correspondence may p r o ve a useful variable for explaining experimentally observed behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces preliminary notation and de nitions, Section 3 de nes and analyzes equivalence classes relative to the notions of rationalizability, Nash, and correlated equilibrium, in particular, showing that they coincide for 2 2 games, but are otherwise distinct and in a general sense unrelated for 2 3 and larger games. Section 4 considers robust and risk dominant equilibria, Section 5 discusses related literature, Section 6 concludes. Most proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Preliminary Notions
Let I = f1 : : : n g denote the set of players, let S i denote player i's space of pure strategies, and S = i2I S i the space of pure strategy pro les. Let i = ( S i ) denote the set of probability distributions on S i , = i2I i the space of mixed strategies, and (S) the probability measures on S. L e t also S ;i = j6 =i S j , and ;i = j6 =i j and set K i = # S i , K = P i2I K i , = i2I K i . In what follows, we consider nite normal form games, i.e., where n and each K i are nite, and x both the set of players and the set of strategy pro les, so that we can identify a game with a point i n Euclidean space 2 IR n and, accordingly, the space of games with the whole Euclidean space IR n . W e also denote by i 2 IR the payo array o f player i. For a given normal form game, 2 IR n , denote by e RAT ( ) S the set of rationalizable strategy pro les, b y e NE ( ) the set of Nash equilibria, and by e CE ( ) (S) t h e s e t o f correlated equilibria. 3 Further, denote by e RAT , e NE , a n d e CE the respective correspondences mapping games to corresponding sets of equilibria, and by RAT IR n S, NE IR n , and CE IR n (S) the respective graphs of the equilibrium correspondences.
The de nition of equivalence class that is given below, builds on two ingredients the rst is based on continuity of equilibrium or related correspondences, and the second is based on the fact that relabeling players and their strategies does not really change the game. The following lemma follows from the fact that e RAT e CE , a n d e NE are semi-algebraic. 4 Lemma 1 There exist closed, lower dimensional subsets of the space o f games, D RAT D CE , and D NE IR n , such that e RAT e CE , a n d e NE are continuous respectively on the complements IR n nD RAT , IR n nD CE , a n d IR n nD NE . Moreover, each of the complements consists of a nite number of connected c omponents.
The nature of the complements IR n nD RAT and IR n nD NE will play a n i mportant role in the classi cations. Notice that, since rationalizabity a n d interated strict dominance are equivalent f o r t wo-player games, (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) , Ch. 2, p. 51), it follows that, at any g a m e 2 IR 2 nD RAT , t h e n umber of strategies surviving iterated strict dominance is locally constant. Also, since, for two-player games, continuity of e NE is equivalent to all Nash equilibria being locally unique, (see van Damme (1991), Ch. 3, p. 55, where strongly stable corresponds to what we call locally unique), implies that, at any g a m e IR n nD NE , the set of Nash equilibria consists of a nite (and odd) number of locally unique Nash equilibria. 5 The other important ingredient in the de nition of equivalence class, can be formalized by means of certain (linear) maps, which, following Nash (1951), we call symmetry operations. These maps identify games through relabeling of the players' strategies and/or of the players themselves. 6 More precisely, let P a be the set of all permutations p a : I ! I satisfying K pa(i) = K i i2 I, let P s be the set of all permutations p s = ( p i s : S i ! S i ) i2I , a n d let: a = f a : IR n ! IR n j a ( ) = ( pa(i) k p ;1 a (1) :: k p ;1 a (n) ) i2I p a 2 P a 2 IR n g s = f s : IR n ! IR n j s ( ) = ( i p 1 s (k 1 ) :: p n s (kn) ) i2I p s 2 P s 2 IR n g: We s a y a map : IR n ! IR n is a symmetry operation within the class of n-player operations. This space depends on the numberof players and the cardinality of the strategy spaces, i.e., on K 1 : : : K n , which, to save notation, we o f t e n leave out. The maps p a 2 P a p s 2 P s correspond respectively to relabeling of the players and of the players' strategies. The maps a 2 a s 2 s are the maps induced on the space of games by corresponding maps p a and p s . Hence, a denotes the set of all possible relabelings of the players, while s denotes the set of all possible relabelings of players' strategies. Notice that elements of a , a n d s are always matrices with determinant + o r ;1.
Next, we i n troduce the notion of equivalence, the main concept of this paper, which can be seen as a procedure associating to any g i v en (equilibrium) correspondence, e : IR n ! X, an equivalence relation on the underlying space of games IR n .
De nition 1 Let X be some set, and let IR n be the space o f K 1 K n games in normal form with n players and let e : IR n ! X be a n (equilibrium) correspondence o n t h i s s p ace of games. We say two games 0 1 2 IR n are equivalent relative to e, which we denote by 0 1 , if there exists a symmetry operation 2 (K 1 : : : K n ), a n d a c ontinuous path : 0 1] ! IR n , with (0) = 0 and (1) = ( 1 ), such that, for all 2 ( 0 1]), e is continuous at .
Since we require that e be continuous at all games along the path , including the games at the endpoints 0 and ( 1 ), we strictly speaking de ne equivalence only for a subset of IR n . As mentioned, if e is semialgebraic, then the subset is open and dense in IR n and the set of games at which the e is discontnuous will be contained in a lower dimensional subset (see Lemmas 1 and 6). The following shows that De nition 1 indeed de nes an equivalence relation. Lemma 2 The relation de nes an equivalence r elation on the space o f games in IR n at which e is continuous.
Some Standard Equivalence Classes
Together with De nition 1, we s a y t h a t t wo games 0 1 2 IR n are respectively rationalizable and Nash equivalent, w h i c h w e denote respectively by 0 RAT 1 and 0 NE 1 , if they are equivalent relative to respectively e RAT and e NE . While we could de ne the equivalence classes analogously for correlated equilibria, to simplify the analysis, we s a y that two g a m e s which assigns to any game , the dimension of the corresponding set of correlated equilibria. Since the the set of correlated equilibria of a given game is always a nonempty, compact, and convex polyhedron, de ned by a n i t e n umber of linear inequalities, its dimension is always well-de ned. It turns out that checking for changes in the dimension of the set of equilibria (continuity o f e dCE ) i s m uch easier than checking for continuity o f e CE . Although in principle, changes in the dimension could occur at points where e CE is continuous, we v i e w t h e c hanges in dimension themselves as signi cant geometric or topological events of the correspondence e CE .
2 2 Games
In this section we consider the case where n = 2 and also K 1 = K 2 = 2 . W e will see how the equivalence classes de ned above m a k e game-theoretically meaningful distinctions, and lead to the same characterizations in this case. However, before giving the full characterizations of the rationalizable, correlated and Nash equivalence classes for this case, we rst introduce the notion of a nondegenerate two-player game, (see von Stengel (2002) ), which we use to compute and describe the standard equivalence classes.
De nition 2 Let 2 IR 2 be a two-player game in normal form. We say the game is nondegenerate if any mixed s t r ategy x 2 i of player i has at most jsupp(x)j pure b est responses, for i = 1 2 w e a l s o s a y is degenerate if it is not nondegenerate.
The following is a basic fact concerning nondegenerate games see von Stengel (2002). Lemma 3 If 2 IR 2 is nondegenerate two-player game in normal form, then no pure stategy of any player is weakly dominated b y o r p ayo equivalent to a mixed s t r ategy of the same player that is not itself strictly dominated.
Accordingly, w e s a y that two g a m e s 0 1 2 IR 2 are nondegenerate equivalent, which w e denote by 0 ND 1 , if they are equivalent r e l ative to the correspondence e ND : IR 2 ! 0 1] e ND ( ) = ( 1 if is degenerate 0 else : Furthermore, for any nondegenerate two-player game 2 IR 2 , let the set ] = f 0 2 IR 2 j 0 ND g denote the nondegenerate equivalence class associated to let also 0 ] = ( ] 0 ] (cl ] \ cl 0 ])) , f o r 0 2 IR 2 nondegenerate with ] \ 0 ] = , and where cl( ) denotes the closure and ( ) denotes the interior. 7 The importance of the nondegenerate games and nondegenerate equivalence classes for the equivalence classes resulting from the standard equilibrium concepts mentioned above, follows from the following result.
Proposition 1 If two two-player games are nondegenerate equivalent, then they are also rationalizable, correlated, and Nash equivalent. This shows that the rationalizable, correlated, and Nash equivalence classes have the more basic nondegenerate equivalence classes in common, or, in other words, their intersections contain the nondegenerate equivalence classes. We view this as evidence that the players' best-reply correspondences are in a speci c sense fundamental to the three equilibrium notions.
We are nally in a position to compute the standard equivalence classes for the 2 2 t wo-player games. It is easy to check that, in this case, the degenerate games are games with the property i 1 = i 2 for i = 1 o r i = 2 (or both). Moreover, the degenerate 2 2 games divide the space of all 2 2 games, (which w e i d e n tify with IR 8 ), into 16 connected components of nondegenerate games. (Notice that by Proposition 1 all games within any one of the 16 connected components are rationalizable, correlated, and Nash equivalent.) Applying the symmetry operations of relabeling the players' strategies, further identi es some of the 16 components and leads to 5 classes of nondegenerate games, which can be unambiguously represented by the following games:
Applying the symmetry operation of relabeling the players, allows to further identify 2 and 3 , (i.e., 2 ND 3 ), which means that there are exactly four nondegenerate equivalence classes: 1 ] 2 ] 4 ] and 5 ]. We state this formally.
Lemma 4 For the 2 2 two-player games, there a r e exactly four distinct nondegenerate equivalence classes, described b y 1 ] 2 ] 4 ] 5 ]: 7 In the de nition of 0 ], besides the nondegenerate games in ] 0 ], we also include all degenerate games that lie between two neighboring connected components of ] and 0 ], which are precisely the games in cl ]\cl 0 ] without points on the boundary.
With Proposition 1, this implies that each of the correspondences e RAT e dCE , and e NE distinguishes at most the equivalence classes 1 ] 2 ] 4 ] 5 ]. The next proposition provides a precise characterization.
Proposition 2 For the 2 2 two-player games, the rationalizable, correlated, and Nash equivalence classes all coincide and distinguish exactly three classes of games, which are described b y 1 2 ] 4 ] 5 ]:
Proof. It follows directly from Proposition 1 that there are at most four rationalizable, correlated and Nash equivalence classes, since all games within the corresponding nondegenerate equivalence classes 1 ] 2 ] 4 ], and 5 ] are also equivalent with respect to these notions. Moreover, it is easy to check that the games 1 2 can all be connected by paths of games along which e RAT , e NE , a n d e dCE are all continuous, so that they are also rationalizable, correlated and Nash equivalent. This means that, at most, there are three classes 1 2 ] 4 ] and 5 ] of rationalizable, correlated and Nash equivalent games. Next we show that for each of the three equivalence concepts there are in fact exactly these three equivalence classes. We start by showing it for Nash equivalence and show 1 6 NE 4 , 1 6 NE 5 , a n d 4 6 NE 5 .
This immediately implies corresponding statements about correlated and rationalizable equivalence.
The proof is geometric. Take the game 4 . It has a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies and is depicted in Figure 1a below t o g e t h e r w i t h the players' best-reply correspondences. Any game in the neighborhood has similar best-reply correspondences, which m a y be slightly shifted in direction of the arrows on the gure, parallel to the axes. Shifting the best-reply correspondences su ciently will eventually lead to a game with a continuum of Nash equilibria such as the game 41 
! which is exactly halfway b e t ween 4 and 1 and which is depicted in Figure 1b. At such a game the correspondence e NE is clearly discontinuous. Similarly, it can be checked that games from the class 4 ] (and 1 ]) have a unique correlated equilibrium and hence the dimension jumps from zero to one when reaching games like 41 and it is clear from Figure 1a that such jumps are unavoidable. This shows 1 6 NE 4 and 1 6 CE 4 , a s w ell as 4 6 NE 5 and 4 6 CE 5 . Obviously, 1 6 RAT 4 since the number of strategies per player surviving iterated strict dominance is respectly one and two for the two games. To see 4 6 RAT 5 is somewhat more suttle.
Both games 4 and 5 have the same number of rationalizable strategies, however it is not di cult to see that it is impossible to join the two g a m e s along a path where e RAT is everywhere continuous. Discontinuities at games between the two classes are unavoidable, since, in any arbitrarily small neighborhood around such games, e RAT goes from containing all strategies to just containing one strategy pro le. (Notice, however, that this does not mean that a path between the two classes along which t h e n umber of rationalizable strategies is constant does not exist as for example the path through the game where all entries are zero.) Next, take the game 5 . It has a unique mixed strategy equilibrium and two pure strategy equilibria and is also depicted in Figure 2a along with the best-reply correspondences. Again, the arrows show possible (parallel) shifts of the best-reply correspondences for neighboring games. Also here one sees that whatever the direction of the shifts, it is impossible to leave the class of games 5 ] without encountering either a game with a continuum of Nash equilibria or games like t h e g a m e 51 = (1 1) ( 1 2 0) (0 1 2 ) ( 1 On the other hand, the games 5 and 1 cannot be correlated equivalent, since the dimensions of the corresponding sets of correlated equilibria are three and zero respectively. Similarly, they cannot be rationalizable equivalent, since again the number of strategies per player surviving iterated strict dominance is respectively two and one. This completes the proof. 2
Somewhat surprisingly, the equivalence classes for the three standard concepts of rationalizability, Nash, and correlated equilibrium all coincide and consist of (i) games with only one pure Nash equilibrium, 1 2 ], (ii) games with only one mixed Nash equilibrium, 4 ], and (iii) games with one mixed and two pure Nash equilibria, 5 ]. Examples of games in the di erent classes are (i) the prisoners' dilemma games and other strict dominance solvable games, (ii) matching pennies type games, and (iii) chicken, battle of the sexes, and other coordination games.
Notice that the games in (ii) and (iii) have all strategies rationalizable, but are nonetheless not rationalizable equivalent. Similarly, all games in (i) and (ii) have a unique correlated and a unique Nash equilibrium, yet are neither correlated nor Nash equivalent. Showing these non-equivalences constitutes the main part of the proof a basic step consists in showing that discontinuities of all three correspondences e RAT e NE , a n d e CE are inevitable when leaving the class of games 4 ]. This also shows that simply counting the number of rationalizable strategies or of Nash (or correlated) equilibria is not su cient to obtain the corresponding classi cation.
The above classi cation for 2 2 games has already been obtained for example by Rapoport and Guyer (1966) , typically based on purely gametheoretic considerations, and is also often used when discussing or describing 2 2 games. We take this as evidence that the present procedure can yield game-theoretically meaningful distinctions. However, we will come back to 2 2 games further below i n t h e c o n text of robust and risk dominant equilibria, where we also discuss some experimental literature.
Larger Games
We next consider games larger than 2 2 games and show that the classi cations of the rationalizable, correlated, and Nash equivalence classes distinguish di erent games in general. 2 3 games. It can be shown that the space of 2 3 is divided by the degenerate games into 336 connected components of nondegenerate games, which after applying the symmetry operations reduce to 28 nondegenerate equivalence classes. The equivalence classes for the 2 3 games are all di erent across the three mentioned standard equilibrium concepts. It can be shown that there are four distinct rationalizable equivalence classes consisting of a class represented by games with one strategy per player surviving iterated strict dominance, two classes of games with two strategies per player surviving iterated strict dominance, and games with all strategy pro les surviving iterated strict dominance. Examples of the latter games are ! 7 = (1 3) (0 2) (1 0) (0 0) (1 2) (0 3) ! which satisfy 6 RAT 7 . It can further be shown that there are also four distinct correlated equivalence classes represented by the games 0 1 , 0 4 , a n d 0 5 , obtained from 1 , 4 , 5 by adding a strictly dominated strategy for player 2 to make them 2 3 games, and games like 6 or 7 which c a n be shown to also satisfy 6 CE 7 , and where the dimension of the set of correlated equilibria is ve for both games. Finally, it can be shown that there are ve distinct Nash equivalence classes represented by the games 0 1 , 0 4 , 0 5 , 6 , a n d 7 , w h i c h can all be shown not to be Nash equivalent. The latter two are representatives of games with two pure strategy and one mixed strategy equilibria, 6 , where all pure strategy pro les are in the support of some Nash equilibrium, and of games with with one pure strategy and two mixed strategy equilibria, 7 .
Hence, unlike the case of 2 2 games, the classi cations for the three standard equivalence concepts are all di erent i n t h e 2 3 games and can be summarized as follows. There are four distinct rationalizable equivalence classes described by 0 1 0 2 : : : ] 0 4 : : : ] 0 5 : : : ] 00 4 6 7 ] there are also four distinct correlated equivalence classes, which slightly di er from the rationalizable equivalence classes, and are described by : : ] 0 5 : : : ] 6 ] 7 ]: For reasons of space and since they can be unambiguously determined from the mentioned set of 28 distinct nondegenerate equivalence classes, we h a ve not listed all the representatives of the nondegenerate equivalence classes and have instead referred to them by the dots. The nondegenerate equivalence class 00 4 ] is what distinguishes the rationalizable and the correlated equivalence classes, while the nondegenerate equivalence classes 6 ] a n d 7 ] are the ones distinguishing the Nash and the correlated equivalence classes. The games 0 4 and 00 4 are discussed below.
Deciding the equivalence class directly from the game. The above shows that within the nondegenerate 2 2 and 2 3 games, knowing the number of Nash equilibria #e NE ( ) is not su cient to decide the equivalence class of a game, (see 1 and 4 ). However, knowing the Nash equilibrium distributions, i.e., knowing e NE ( ), is su cient to place the game unambiguously within its Nash equivalence class. This fails with the 3 3 g a m e s as is illustrated by the following two g a m e s
C A :
Both games have the same Nash equilibria, namely the pure equilibrium, where both play strategy 1, the mixed equilibrium where players 1 and 2 mix between respectively strategies 2 and 3, and 1 and 2, and, nally, the completely mixed equilibrium, y et it can be shown that the two g a m e s are not Nash equivalent. To understand why, o n e m a y notice that the indices of the two mixed equilibria do not coincide. However, it can also be shown that having the same Nash equilibrium distributions with same indices is still not su cient to imply Nash equivalence of the games, thus implying that besides the index, further (topological) invariants also matter in determining the Nash equivalence class see Germano (1998) for further discussion and de nitions. Further, we already saw t h a t w i t h i n t h e 2 2 games, knowing e RAT ( ) or e dCE ( ) w as not su cient to place in its respective equivalence class, as the games 4 and 5 showed for rationalizable equivalence and 1 and 4 showed for correlated equivalence. 8 An important s t e p f o r c haracterizing equivalence classes of given equilibrium concepts will be to nd (necessary and) su cient conditions which need to be satis ed by t wo games in order to be equivalent. The conditions above provide some necessary conditions.
Relations between (standard) equivalence classes. We h e r e s h o w
that the coincidence of the rationalizable, Nash, and correlated equivalence classes for 2 2 games is indeed very special for this class of games. As the following 2 3 matching pennies type games show t wo games that are Nash or correlated equivalent (or both) need not be rationalizable equivalent ! :
Both 0 4 and 00 4 have a the same unique Nash and correlated equilibrium (involving only the rst two strategies) and are clearly Nash and correlated equivalent. However, the set of rationalizable strategies changes, as player 2's third strategy is no longer strictly dominated in 00 4 . Similarly, t wo games that are rationalizable or correlated equivalent ( o r both) need not be Nash equivalent, as the games 6 and 7 above s h o w.
Furthermore, the following rock-scissors-paper type games, 10 and 11 , show that two games that are rationalizable or Nash equivalent (or both) need not be correlated equivalent 10 
C A :
Both games have all three strategies rationalizable and they have the same unique, completely mixed Nash equilibrium. However, the dimension of the correlated equilibrium correspondence, is zero at 10 (the unique Nash equilibrium is also the unique correlated equilibrium) and eight a t 11 .
To summarize then, unlike w i t h t h e 2 2 case, where the three equivalence notions, RAT , CE , a n d NE , coincide, somewhat surprisingly, i t i s possible to nd examples, already within the 3 3 games, showing that Nash or correlated equivalence (or both) need not imply rationalizable equivalence that rationalizable or correlated equivalence (or both) need not imply Nash equivalence and that Nash or rationalizable equivalence (or both) need not imply correlated equivalence. This means that equivalence with respect to one concept does not imply equivalence for any of the other two and, moreover, also intersecting the equivalence classes of two of the concepts does not imply equivalence with respect to the other. 9 However, we found one notion, nondegenerate equivalence, whose equivalence classes, at least for two p l a yer games, are always contained in the equivalence classes of these three concepts, hence also in their intersection (see Proposition 1). We turn to a further equilibrium notion.
Robust Equilibria and Risk Dominance
We consider a fourth equilibrium concept, namely that of robust equilibrium of Kajii and Morris (1997a, b). 10 The equilibrium concept involves consideration of neighboring incomplete information games. Let T s i denote a countable set of standard types of player i, and let T c i = S i denote the set of committed types of player i the set of all possible types of player i is T i = T s i T c i , let also T = i2I T i and T ;i = j6 =i T j . Notice that a committed (or \crazy") type of player i of type t i will have a strictly dominated strategy to play pure strategy t i . F rom a complete information game 2 IR n and a probability distribution over types P 2 (T ), we can derive an incomplete information game with payo s 
De nition 3 A canonical {elaboration co n s i s t s o f a c omplete informa-
tion game and a probability distribution P 2 (T) such that P T s ] = 1 ; 9 Looking at Hannan sets (see Hart and Mas-Colell (2003) ) and the equivalence classes implied by their correspondence (or dimension) may p r o vide more common ground between these three equivalence notions. We l e a ve this for further research. 10 for 2 0 1]. A strategy pro le 2 is robust to all canonical elaborations if, 8 > 0, 9 > 0 such that, 8 , every {elaboration of has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium with ( ) 1 ; . Finally, we say a strategy pro le is a robust equilibrium if it is robust to all canonical elaborations.
Again with De nition 1, we s a y t h a t t wo g a m e s 0 1 2 IR n are robust equivalent, w h i c h w e denote by 0 RE 1 , if they are equivalent w i t h respect to e RE , where e RE is the robust equilibrium correspondence.
To get some intuition about robust equivalence classes, consider the 2 2 games. The analog of Proposition 1 does not hold for robust equivalence. In fact, it can be shown that the correspondence e RE is not always continuous at nondegenerate games. To see this, notice that it follows from Kajii and Morris (1997b) that, for 2 2 games with two strict equilibria, the robust equilibria coincide with the risk dominant equilibria (see Harsanyi and Selten (1988) or van Damme (2002)). One implication of this is that there is a set of nondegenerate games in 5 ] a t w h i c h the robust equilibrium correspondence is not continuous, namely, = ( 2 5 ] ( ) :
These are precisely games in 5 ] where the deviation losses for the two (strict) equilibria are equal. An example of such a game is the game 5 itself it is easy to see that with arbitrarily small variations of the payo s, the robust equilibrium moves from the top-left to the bottom-right strategy pro le. Furthermore, Kajii and Morris (1997b) have also shown that nondegenerate games in 1 ], 2 ], and 4 ] a l l h a ve a unique robust equilibrium which is also the unique Nash equilibrium. We summarize this as follows.
Lemma 5 Every nondegenerate 2 2 two-player game not in has a unique robust equilibrium, which coincides with the unique risk dominant Nash equilibrium of the game. Now, we can state the characterization of the robust equivalence classes for 2 2 games. Proposition 3 For the 2 2 two-player games, there a r e two distinct robust equivalence classes described b y 1 2 5 ]n and 4 ]:
Proof. The proof is in two steps. First, we s h o w t h a t a n y t wo games in 1 2 5 ]n a s w ell as in 4 ] are robust equivalent. Second, we s h o w t h a t games from the two di erent classes are not robust equivalent.
Clearly, all games in 1 2 ] are robust equivalent, and the same holds for games in 4 ]. Similarly, despite the discontinuity a t , a l l g a m e s i n 5 ]n are robust equivalent, due to symmetry operations identifying games with strict equilibria at the top-left and bottom-right pro les with corresponding games with strict equilibria at the bottom-left and top-right pro les. Finally, to see equivalence of a game from 1 2 ] with a game from 5 ]n , consider the following gamê
where < 1. For 2 (0 1), we h a vê 2 5 ]n , while for < 0, we h a vê 2 1 2 ]. In particular, we h a ve t h a t 1 2 2 5 ]n a n d ; 1 2 2 1 2 ]. On the other hand, for all < 1, the game^ has a unique robust equilibrium at the top-left strategy pro le, and, moreover, the correspondence e RE is continuous at any s u c h game. This shows in particular^ 1 2 RE^ ; 1 2 and hence the rst step.
To see the second step, cosider the game = (1 0) (0 ) (0 1) ( 0) ! where again < 1. For 2 (0 1), we h a ve 2 4 ], while for < 0, we have 2 1 2 5 ]n . However, as can be seen in Figure 3 , and analogous to the reasoning in the proof of Proposition 2, discontinuities of e RE are unavoidable when going from games in 4 ] to games in 1 2 5 ]n . (Notice that the bold dots in Figure 3 indicate the (unique) robust equilibria.) This shows that games in 4 ] are not robust equivalent to games in 1 2 5 ]n and so completes the proof. 2
Robust equivalence identifes games in 5 ]n w i t h g a m e s i n 1 2 ], i.e., games with two pure Nash equilibria with games with unique pure Nash equilibrium. W e view this as a fundamental departure from the equivalence classes obtained in the previous section, also since most casual discussions or other classi cations in the literature typically distinguish the two classes of games, see, e.g., Rapoport et al. (1976) , Carlsson and van Damme (1993), Roth (1995) , or Friedman (1996) .
Moreover, we view experimental evidence as providing support for the robust equivalence classes in the following sense. Take the game^ of Eq. (1) and suppose that is arbitrarily close to zero (units could be millions of euros). In this case, while it matters for rationalizable, correlated, and Nash equivalence, whether is positive or negative, (since a discontinuity occurs at = 0), it does not matter for robust equivalence, as long as is su ciently small further, when i s e q u a l t o 1 , t h e n a d i s c o n tinuity o f the set of robust equilibria occurs, (since^ 1 is in ), while each of the rationalizable, correlated, and Nash correspondences are all continuous at such a g a m e . In both cases, experimental evidence seems to be better explained by the predictions of the robust equilibria because of the usual risk dominance argument f o r close to 0, and because of the issue of which strategy pro le to coordinate on for close to 1 see Ochs (1995) , Straub (1995) , Friedman (1996) , Crawford (1997) , for experimental evidence, and also Cabrales et al. (2002) , who test further connections with global games.
At the same time, all four equilibrium concepts identify all games in 1 2 ] a s w ell as all games in 5 ] o r 5 ]n . In particular, this means that, for games in 1 2 ], whether the (unique) pro le surviving iterated dominance, which is also the unique Nash, correlated and robust equilibrium is also a Pareto e cient outcome or not, is irrelevant to the equilibrium concepts in the sense of the induced equivalence classes on the other hand, there is experimental evidence suggesting that at least some extra variance is observed when the unique equilibrium point does not coincide with the Pareto e cient outcome, as in the prisoners' dilemma see, e.g., Rapoport et al. (1976) and Roth (1995) , and Ahn et al. (2002) for some experiments on such games. Similarly, for games in 5 ] o r 5 ]n , whether or not the risk dominant equilibrium is also Pareto e cient or whether and what type of a battle of the sexes game it is, although not relevant to the studied equivalence classes, seems to matter experimentally see, e.g., Ochs (1995) , Crawford (1997) , Battalio et al. (2001) , and van Huyck and Battalio (2002) .
A v ariable that may b e w orth considering when testing experimental behavior is a measure of the distance of the given game to the next closest discontinuity of the relevant equilibrium correspondence under study. Finally, the class 4 ], which is also distinguished by all four concepts, appears to exhibit relatively more homogenous behavior see Erev and Roth (1998) for experimental evidence on such g a m e s a s w ell as further references.
Related Literature
As mentioned in the Introduction, the question of classifying or identifying games has not received much attention in the game theory literature. There are some exceptions, however, mainly from the literature on experiments and games, combinatorics and games, psychology, and bounded rationality. We discuss these in turn. Rapoport et al. (1976) consider ordinal 2 2 t wo p l a yer games which, after distinguishing 78 strategically di erent games, they classify into 24 di erent classes. Their distinctions are based on several notions, including whether the \natural outcome" (this is the intersection of the maxmin proles) is a Nash equilibrium, whether it is Pareto e cient, or what kinds of threats the players can exercise against each other. In particular, the following three (coordination type) games all belong to di erent classes, (1992) point out, it is not clear how their procedure extends to larger games, since certain parts of their classi cation are de ned speci cally for the 2 2 games. Their analysis has a very strong experimental motivation, which m a y explain the fact that their distinctions are not necessarily related to the standard non-cooperative equilibrium concepts. Rapoport and Guyer (1966) and Harris (1972) study related distinctions see also Rapoport et al. (1976) for further related references. B ar any et al. (1992) take a combinatorial approach and classify m n two player ordinal games. They also start from the set of strategically di erent (ordinal) games and look at the numbers of possible outcome sets generated by t h e p a yo matrices, as well as the numbers of shapes of the corresponding convex hulls. They then derive asymptotic estimates for the number of strategically di erent games ( (mn) 2mn ), for the number of di erent outcome sets ( (mn) mn ), and for the number of di erent convex hulls of the outcome sets ( e (mn) 2=3 ). In the case of 2 2 t wo p l a yer games, they start from the 78 strategically di erent games and obtain 24 di erent outcome sets and 7 di erent shapes of the convex hulls. In particular, the games 61 64 68 also belong to di erent outcome sets which also have di erent shapes while on the other hand, the following four games, (4 4) (3 3) (2 2) (1 1) ! (3 4) (2 1) (1 2) (4 3) ! (2 3) (4 1) (1 4) (3 2) ! (2 3) (4 1) (3 2) (1 4) ! all have the same shape of the convex hull, and the rst two h a ve the same outcome set, which is di erent from the outcome set of the last two. (Notice that, while the outcomes for all four games lie on a straight line, the rst two are coordination games, the third is a dominance solvable game and the last a matching pennies type game they correspond to games under In contrast, there are just over 110,000 di erent path components separated by the degenerate games, which after applying the symmetry operations reduce to just above 530 di erent nondegenerate equivalence classes, which further reduce to 32 di erent Nash equivalence classes for the 3 3 case (see Germano (1998) ). Within the mathematics literature, Conway (2001) shows how e q u i v alence classes of games can have a nice mathematical structure. He considers the class of so-called nim-type games, (these are two p l a yer zero sum games where agents make sequential moves, one after the other, choosing from a given set of strategies that decreases as they make m o ves), and shows that the set of equivalence classes of these nim-type games can be identi ed with the space of nonstandard or surreal numbers. This shows that equivalence classes of games can correspond to interesting mathematical objects. (For further literature on nim-type and related games see also Guy (1991) and and Berlekamp et al. (2003) .)
Partly motivated by literature aiming to extend certain results from potential games to larger classes of games, Morris and Ui (2002) de ne and characterize notions of best-reply, better-reply, and von Neumann and Morgenstern equivalence. These are increasingly restrictive equivalence notions, and the weakest one, best-reply equivalence, which obtains when two games have the same best-reply correspondence, is already a substantially stronger notion than our notion of nondegenerate equivalence. Already within 2 2 games, best-reply equivalence distinguishes uncountably many matching pennies and coordination games. (See Morris and Ui (2002) for related literature and applications.)
Also related are the notions of analogy or similarity, t ypically studied within the context of decision situations. Besides an extensive literature in psychology on analogical and case-based reasoning, see for example Holyoak and Thagard (1995) and references there, related work has also been done in the economics literature. Rubinstein (1988) de nes a notion of similarity, which he uses to de ne rules of thumb via a procedural rationality approach. Schmeidler (1995, 2001 ) formulate a case-based decision theory which, in a general way, a l l o ws decision makers to make use of similarities when assessing the performance of di erent strategies. Similarity functionals are also derived from agents' preferences and memories. Samuelson (2001) models analogies as part of a model which studies the consequences of individuals economizing on their reasoning resources van Huyck and Battalio (2002) test whether experimental subjects use certain rules to play similar, but di erent, coordination games Jehiel (2002) develops an equilibrium concept, analogy-based expectation equilibrium, which is also based on agents using analogies to obtain simpli ed representations of games and of reactions of their opponents.
Conclusion
We study a procedure for identifying games into broad and typically nitely many w ell-de ned equivalence classes These constitute a classi cation of the games relative to the given equilibrium concept, thus re ecting basic aspects of the logic and rationality of the underlying equilibrium concept. The overall procedure gives an alternative w ay of comparing and testing equilibrium concepts as well as of thinking about strategic situations through the geometries of equilibrium correspondences.
At the same time, many questions are left unanswered. First, understanding the structure of the set of equivalence classes for rationalizable, Nash, correlated, or robust equilibria for any g i v en space of normal form games, and to see how these change when strategies and/or players are added is not an easy task. Our analysis focused on small two player games and it seems worthwhile studying larger games in more detail. It would also be interesting to obtain a clearer understanding of general relationships between the rationalizable, correlated, Nash, and robust equivalence classes.
The stronger notion of nondegenerate equivalence was seen to provide a rst basic link at least for the rst three concepts the Hannan sets, which are compact convex polyhedra containing the correlated equilibrium sets (Hart and Mas-Colell (2003) ) may also be worth studying in this context.
On the other hand, a somewhat unsatisfactory aspect of the present analysis is that, while it leads to nitely many equivalence classes (e.g., when the correspondence is semi-algebraic), the number of classes distinguished may increase very rapidly with the number of players and/or strategies. For example, McKelvey and McLennan (1997) show that games with ten players with two strategies each, can have up to 1.3 million competely mixed (regular) equilibria (see Keiding (1997) , McLennan (1997) , and von Stengel (1999) for more literature on the maximal numbers of Nash equilibria.) Although it needs to be understood exactly to what extent s u c h n umbers are related to say t h e n umber of Nash equivalence classes, it nonetheless suggests that such n umbers may also be very large.
Something that has not been considered here, is whether the classications can give insights about degenerate or extensive form games and re nements of equilibria. One could look at (standard) equivalence classes around given degenerate games. A further possibility w ould be to consider re nements concepts and de ne equivalence classes directly on spaces of degenerate or extensive form games, i.e, apply the procedure to concepts like perfect or sequential equilibria on these (sub)spaces of games.
The general procedure of de ning equivalence classes from discontinuities of (equilibrium) correspondences could also be applied to cooperative games or games in characteristic function form and respective solution concepts. In fact, one could use transformations, mapping normal form games (assuming transferable payo s) to characteristic function games (i.e., cooperative games with transferable payo s see e.g., Myerson (1991) ), and apply the procedure to cooperative solution concepts such as the core to obtain classi cations of both the characteristic function and the normal form games.
But while the procedure applies to almost arbitrary spaces of games and equilibrium concepts, it may be useful to nd ways of de ning equivalence classes that are as unrestricted as possible by the speci cs of the actual game form or of the underlying space of games as e.g., the notion of a coordination or competitive game does not depend on whether the game is a 2 2 o r a 3 3 3 game. Despite some of its rigidity, w e view the present approach as a rst step. More in this direction, but within a di erent c o n text, Samuelson (2001) uses automata to characterize agents and thus distinguishes fairly di erent t ypes of games such as tournaments, ultimatum and bargaining games based on complexity measures of the automata Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001) and Jehiel (2002) contain yet other approaches of implicitly identifying games into potentially broad and unrestricted classes.
Proof of Proposition 1. Let 0 1 2 IR 2 be two t wo-player games with 0 ND 1 . By de nition of ND both games are nondegenrate. We n e e d to show that (i) 0 1 have no pure strategies that are weakly dominated or payo equivalent to a mixed strategy that is not strictly dominated (ii) 0 RAT 1 (iii) 0 CE 1 and (iv) 0 NE 1 . (i) This is shown in von Stengel (2002) , p. 1740. (ii) Since a nondegenerate game has neither redundant n o r w eakly dominated strategies that are not strictly dominated strategies, and since all games along the path between 0 and ( 1 ) are nondegenerate, the number of stategies surviving iterated strict dominance must be constant along the path and hence 0 RAT 1 .
(iii) To see that two nondegenerate equivalent games are correlated equivalent, we rst recall the following well-known lemma, (see for example Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) , Ch. 2, p. 57). Lemma 7 Let = ( A B) 2 IR 2mn be a two player game in normal form. Then p 2 IR mn is a correlated e quilibrium of if and only if it is a solution to the linear inequalities: Cp 0 1 mn p = 1 and p 0 (2) where C is the (m(m ; 1) + n(n ;1)) mn matrix de ned b y : 0  B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
Let E be the matrix consisting of all rows of (C 1 mn I mn ) T , that hold with equality f o r a l l v ectors p 2 IR mn satisfying (2) at a given game . 11 Then, as a direct application of a well-known result from polyhedral theory, (see, e.g., Nemhauser and Wolsey (1988) , Ch. 2, p. 87), it follows that the dimension of the set of correlated equilibria of is equal to mn;rank(E). Therefore, it su ces to show that the rank of E is locally constant a t . W e w i l l s h o w that it cannot increase. To a void confusion, we n o w x E to consist of all rows holding with equality a t t h e g i v en, nondegenerate game , so that as we c hange , w e k eep the set of rows of E xed while allowing the entries to vary. This means that the only way the dimension of the correlated equilibria can increase as changes is (i) that the rank of E increases or (ii) that there exists a row o f ( C 1 mn I mn ) T not belonging to E at that holds with equality for all correlated equilibria of a close by game 0 and moreover is linearly independent from the rows of E at 0 . W e show t h a t neither case can arise if is nondegenrate. First, notice that if a row o f (C 1 mn I mn ) T does not belong to E, t h e n i t m ust be linearly independent from the rows of E at . And if it is linearly independent from E, and the span of the rows of E does not increase with small perturbations of , i t will continue to be linearly independent f r o m t h e r o ws of E, and moreover, there will be correlated equilibria of the perturbed games at wich s u c h a r o w will continue to hold with strict inequality. Therefore, it remains to show that the span of the rows of E cannot increase with slight perturbations of when is nondegenrate. Suppose that is nondegenerate. Then, by Proposition 3, it has neither redundant nor weakly dominated strategies that are not strictly dominated. To see that the number of linearly independent r o ws of E cannot increase locally, w e m a k e use of the following. Lemma 8 Let = ( A B) 2 IR 2mn be nondegenerate two player game in normal form and C as above, let D be any submatrix obtained f r om (C 1 mn ) T by deleting all rows corresponding to strictly dominated s t r ategies and possibly more, 12 then D has full row rank, i.e., rank(D) = min fmn, number of rows of Dg. Before proving this lemma, we nish the proof of the theorem. Notice that any strictly dominated strategy has probability zero at any correlated equilibrium, which implies that any r o w o f C corresponding to a strictly dominated strategy either holds trivially with equality for all correlated equiliria (i.e., because all corresponding entries of the correlated equilibria are zero), or it holds with strict inequality for some correlated equilibrium. (This can be seen by inspection of the matrix C above.) This implies that all the rows of E that correspond to strictly dominated strategies are ones where all corresponding entries of all correlated equilibria are zero, which in turn implies that the corresponding rows of I mn must also be contained in E. In other words the rows of E that correspond to strictly dominated strategies are spanned by corresponding rows of I mn . Hence the span of these rows together with the corresponding rows of I mn cannot be increased by v arying locally. It remains to see whether it is possible to increase the span of the remaining rows, i.e., whether it is possible to increase the rank of the matrix D obtained from E after deleting all rows corresponding to strictly dominated strategies as well as the corresponding rows of I mn . B y the lemma above, such a matrix has full row rank. This implies that it is not possible, by perturbing its entries to increase its rank. As a consequence, perturbing will not increase the rank of such a submatrix D. But then, we have shown that perturbing will not a ect the rank of E, and hence the dimension of the set of correlated equilibria must remain locally constant.
(iv) Finally, to see that two nondegenerate equivalent games are Nash equivalent, it follows from van Damme (1991), Ch. 3, pp. 52-55, that at a nondegenerate game all Nash equilibria are locally unique and hence e NE is continuous at such games. 2 Proof of Lemma 4. It is shown in the text that at most there can be the equivalence classes 1 ] 2 ] 4 ] 5 ]. Direct inspection of the payo s, shows that games in di ernt classes cannot be nondegenerate equivalent since ties must occur in the payo s when going across the di erent classes. 2 Proof of Lemma 5. This follows from Kajii and Morris (1997a, b). 2 Proof of Lemma 8 . It su ces to consider the statement of the lemma f o r the case where D is the full matrix C, assuming that the original game has no strictly dominated strategies. For, if a game is nondegenerate, then, the reduced game obtained after iteratedly eliminating all strictly dominated strategies will continue to be nondegenerate. Moreover, it will have neither redundant n o r w eakly dominated strategies. But then, inspection of the matrix C shows that it must have f u l l r o w rank since the columns of any set of at least mn rows of C are linearly independent. To see this it may be useful to rewrite the matrix C as the di erence of two matrices C 1 and C 2 in the obvious way, and recall that regularity of a game with no strictly dominated strategies implies that the submatrices of A and B T appearing in C 2 will have f u l l r o w rank (see von Stengel (2002) , p. 1740). This implies that any set of at most mn rows of C = C 1 ; C 2 are linearly independent, and the statement of the lemma follows. 2 
